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Executive Summary 
Achieving a transition to a GE has become a priority 
for  many  governments.  It  will  require  substantial 
policy  reforms  at  the  international,  national  and 
local  levels  in  order  to  help  realize  the  economic 
opportunities arising from a shift to less polluting 
or  resource  efficient  patterns  of  production  and 
consumption, including new sources of employment. 
It also implies managing related structural changes 
including,  for  example,  potentially  adverse  effects 
on  traditional  economic  sectors  underlying  the 
“brown” economy.
A GE sets new priorities for macroeconomic policy, 
with growth being generated by economic sectors 
that are critical or highly material for greening the 
global economy. A portfolio of fiscal, regulatory and 
information-based  policy  measures  will  likely  be 
required to promote an effective and fair transition 
to a GE. Such a portfolio will need to be carefully 
coordinated to ensure measures are complementary 
and  neither  counteract  each  other  nor  generate 
unintended consequences.
Fiscal  policy  plays  a  critical  role  in  a  GE.  The 
means  by  which  tax  revenues  are  generated 
has  a  fundamental  effect  on  the  structure  of 
incentives  facing  businesses  and  households, 
in  both  consumption  and  investment  decisions. 
Secondly, how government spends these revenues 
not  only  on  recurrent  costs,  but  also  investments 
in  public  infrastructure  or  supporting  technology 
development,  plays  a  critical  role  in  shaping  the 
path of economic development. 
Effective  policy  implementation  requires 
cooperation across different parts of government, 
particularly finance and environment departments. 
Building  relevant  administrative  capacity,  for 
example  in  environment  as  well  as  customs  and 
revenue agencies, is also likely to be an important 
dimension,  particularly  in  developing  countries. 
A  well-designed  set  of  indicators  can  help  assess 
interactions  between  the  environment  and  the 
economy, and evaluate progress towards a GE.
 
Available evidence suggests past environmental tax 
reforms  have  often  been  successful  in  improving 
environmental  sustainability  in  specific  sectors.  A 
GE needs to be based on a broader and more robust 
implementation  including,  for  example,  through 
more systematic taxation of fossil-fuel-based energy 
and other natural resources. 
Environmentally-related  charges  currently  raise 
only modest amounts of revenue in many countries, 
but could potentially make a major contribution to 
restoring fiscal positions in many countries, provided 
any  compensation  arrangements  are  carefully 
A green economy (GE) can be defined as one that results in improved human 
well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks 
and ecological scarcities. A GE is characterized by substantially increased 
investments in economic sectors that build on and enhance the Earth’s natural 
capital or reduce ecological scarcities and environmental risks. These sectors 
include renewable energy, low-carbon transport, energy-efficient buildings, 
clean  technologies,  improved  waste  management,  improved  freshwater 
provision, sustainable agriculture and forest management, and sustainable 
fisheries. These investments are driven or supported by national policy reforms 
and the development of international policy and market infrastructure.targeted.  Indeed,  many  developing  countries  are 
highly dependent on natural resource tax revenues.
Green  subsidies  are  likely  to  be  less  effective  than 
pollution  pricing  measures,  but  well-targeted, 
transitional measures may facilitate the shift towards 
a GE in cases where market barriers and positive social 
spillovers clearly exist, or where there are technical or 
political obstacles to the alternatives. 
Reforming  environmentally  harmful  subsidies—
which fuel unsustainable economic activity, are fiscally 
expensive, and often confer limited benefits on poor 
households—should  be  a  key  priority,  particularly 
in the agriculture, energy, fisheries, forest and water 
sectors.  Better  information  on  the  magnitude  and 
distributional  consequences  of  such  programmes 
could help with designing and implementing more 
effective transitional measures.
Finally,  direct  public  expenditure  has  a  key 
role  in  promoting  more  sustainable  economic 
growth,  including  through  cleaner  infrastructure 
provision,  support  for  research  and  development 
in  environmental  technologies.  Indirect  support, 
for  example  through  different  forms  of  public 
guarantees, may also help leverage green investment 
by households and firms.
In  sum,  both  fiscal  policy  and  public  finance  can 
be key drivers of a country’s transition to a greener 
economy—or  a  brake  on  green  growth  and  low 
carbon job creation. This paper explores the linkage 
and  options  available  to  policy-makers  considering 
ways to drive and accelerate the transition to lower-
carbon, more resource-efficient and socially-inclusive 
economic growth.
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I. Introduction
Concerns about environmental sustainability are 
rising…  Without  rapid  transformation  in  energy 
and  land  use  sectors,  the  global  economy  is  at 
serious  risk  from  climate  change.  A  recent  study 
by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) (2010) estimated that current 
and planned policy measures are likely to reduce 
emissions by only around 12 per cent against 2005 
levels by 2020, which is significantly short of the 25-
40 per cent cuts below 1990 levels recommended 
by  the  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate 
Change (IPCC) (2007). Water and air quality is also 
deteriorating rapidly in some cases, particularly in 
major cities in the developing world.1 Significant 
pressures on land and other natural resources are 
already  being  observed,  and  will  likely  increase 
with a population estimated to reach 9 billion by 
2050 (United Nations, 2008): more than a quarter 
of the global marine fish stocks, for example, are 
already estimated to have collapsed.2
...amid a weak economic outlook. The recent crisis 
has adversely affected human welfare across the 
global economy, and the outlook remains fragile. 
Governments have used both monetary and fiscal 
policies  to  strengthen  the  economy  in  the  short 
term,  including  through  specific  measures  to 
encourage environmental protection activities in a 
number of cases. And as the recovery strengthens, 
policy-makers  are  examining  potentially  new 
sources  of  environmentally  sustainable  growth 
in  the  longer  term.  Severe  fiscal  pressures  being 
experienced in many countries are adding to the 
momentum for policy reforms aimed at promoting 
more  efficient  use  of  environmental  resources. 
Such structural adjustments have been observed 
following  previous  economic  crises,  including 
as  conditions  of  multilateral  assistance  by  the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.
A “Green Economy” (GE) is an important concept 
linking  economic  growth  and  environmental 
sustainability.  It  implies  realizing  growth  and 
employment  opportunities  from  less  polluting 
and  more  resource  efficient  activities,  including 
in energy, water, waste, buildings, agriculture and 
forests; and managing related structural changes 
such as potentially adverse effects on vulnerable 
households  and  traditional  economic  sectors. 
The concept of a GE, and its policy implications, 
1 World Bank (2008), for example, estimated that air and water pollution 
in China costs in excess of 4 per cent of GDP annually.
2 Worm and others (2006). Stocks are here defined as having collapsed 
where the current catch level is less than 10 per cent of the maximum 
registered catch. 06 - 07
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will  apply  differently  across  countries,  reflecting 
national  circumstances  and  priorities.  However, 
for  developing  countries  in  particular,  widespread 
opportunities  exist  to  strengthen  economic 
development,  including  poverty  reduction  as  well 
as food and water security in developing countries, 
through  improved  environmental  and  natural 
resource management. 
This  working  paper  explores  economic  policy 
issues  relating  to  managing  the  transition  to  a 
GE,  with  a  particular  focus  on  fiscal  instruments 
and public finance. Section II discusses the concept 
of  a  GE,  and  outlines  some  economic  issues  and 
principles facing policy-makers. Section III provides 
an overview of policy reform issues, including issues 
relating to the coordination of different measures. 
Section IV discusses the critical role of green taxes 
in  influencing  the  prices  of  goods  and  services 
affecting  environmental  conditions  and  natural 
resource  use,  focusing  on  lessons  from  previous 
environmental  fiscal  reforms,  key  policy  design 
and  implementation  issues,  and  reform  priorities. 
Section V discusses the role of expenditure policies 
in  promoting  the  transition  to  a  GE,  including 
green  subsidies,  direct  government  expenditure 
(for  example  on  infrastructure)  and  the  reform  of 
environmentally harmful subsidies. Section VI offers 
concluding remarks.Driving a Green Economy 
Through Public Finance and Fiscal Policy Reform
II. Economic Issues
and Principles
Economic opportunities from transition 
There are likely to be significant opportunities to 
enhance human welfare from better management 
of  scarce  environmental  and  natural  resources. 
Human  activity  is  currently  causing  excessive 
environmental and natural resource degradation, 
often  because  households,  firms  and  even 
governments3  do  not  bear  the  full  societal  costs 
of their actions. Measures to address externality-
generating activities, and reverse policy distortions 
affecting  environmental  conditions  offer  real 
opportunities  for  increased  productivity.  For 
instance,  Ragwitz  and  others  (2009)  suggest 
that  reforming  policies  to  deliver  the  European 
Union’s (EU) climate policy objectives could create 
an  additional  410,000  jobs  and  boost  GDP  by 
approximately 0.25 per cent. 
The  benefits  of  a  transition  to  a  GE  could  be 
particularly  significant  where  existing  policy 
distortions  are  large.  In  agriculture,  removing 
subsidies and tariffs to cotton alone would increase 
real  incomes  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  by  US$150 
million per year (Roubini Global Economics, 2009). 
Distortions  in  fossil  fuel  markets,  arising  from 
annual energy subsidies valued in excess of US$500 
billion,  are  also  highly  significant  (IEA,  2010).  An 
OECD  (2010)  study,  for  example,  estimated  that 
their removal could boost the global economy by 
around 0.3 per cent (and by more than 2.5 per cent 
in the case of India), and reduce global greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions by 10 per cent.
A framework for evaluating progress
However, the case for a GE is often imperfectly 
understood  by  economic  policy-makers,  partly 
due  to  technical  challenges  in  its  assessment. 
Benefits, for example from sustained biodiversity, 
are  not  valued  directly  by  markets,  and  require 
specialized (and highly context specific) assessment 
techniques.4  Evaluating  policy  responses  is  also 
challenging,  given  the  typically  large  number  of 
instruments  bearing  on  environmental  markets, 
the  difficulties  in  assessing  direct  causation,  and 
the perennial problem of comparing the changes 
from the policy with an unknowable baseline. The 
returns  to  key  public  investments,  for  example, 
in  energy  and  transport  infrastructure,  are  often 
extremely difficult to assess, given their complex 
effects  on  private  consumption  patterns  such  as 
car  use.  Large  projects  may  also  have  economy-
wide effects, including through lower fuel prices. A 
sound evaluation framework is therefore needed to 
guide policy towards transition to a GE.
There may be trade-offs between cyclical (short-
term) and structural (long-term) policy objectives. 
Some  traffic  control  measures,  for  example,  can 
improve  both  productivity  and  environmental 
conditions  relatively  swiftly.  Strong  synergies 
between cyclical and structural objectives may also 
exist in the case of some environmental “clean up” 
(Strand and Toman, 2010). In other instances, there 
may be trade-offs: some environmental protection 
measures, such as climate change mitigation, may 
help  sustain  longer-term  productivity,  but  reduce 
incomes  and  raise  production  costs  in  the  short 
term. This renders the choice of discount rate critical 
for  evaluating  investment  returns  and  allocating 
finite  project  and  programme  resources  most 
productively.5  A  key  challenge  for  policy  makers 
seeking  to  ensure  high  returns  to  limited  public 
resources  is  to  properly  account  for  potentially 
important long-term benefits, costs and risks. Even 
reversing  policy  distortions  such  as  reforming 
energy subsidies—clearly desirable from an overall 
economic and environmental perspective—could 
raise  tensions  and  cause  economic  losses  in  the 
short term if broader fiscal policies are not adjusted 
to help sustain incomes, particularly among poor 
households. 
3 The global nature of environmental challenges such as climate change generates a 
“free-rider” problem, which encourages globally excessive emissions levels, even when 
policies are optimal from a national perspective.
4 See, for example, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) website http://
www.teebweb.org/.  
5 Debate on the appropriate discount rate with which to appraise policies in this context 
followed  the  publication  of  the  Stern  Review  (see,  for  example,  Nordhaus  (2007), 
Dasgupta (2007), Weitzman (2007)).08 - 09
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Understanding the distributional impacts of policy is 
critical for managing an equitable transition to a GE. 
The benefits of avoided environmental degradation 
often  fall  disproportionately  on  poor  households. 
Over a billion people of the world’s poorest people, 
for  example,  are  vulnerable  to  unsustainable 
deforestation  (Peskett  and  others,  2008).  The 
differing  distributional  effects  potentially  warrant 
the use of “equity” weights in cost benefit evaluation 
for  environmental  projects  and  programmes.  In 
addition,  policy  responses  may  also  affect  the 
distribution  of  incomes  through  higher  product 
prices and shifting patterns of labour productivity,6 
with the precise effects depending on: i) the extent 
to  which  producers  pass  on  any  additional  costs 
(although full pass through is commonly assumed, 
at least in the short run); ii) specific consumption and 
production patterns for target products (kerosene is 
consumed by wealthy society groups in the case of 
aviation, but used for lighting and heating by poor 
households); and, iii) evaluation timeframes (higher 
prices  may  have  smaller  distributional  effects  if 
viewed  across  an  entire  lifecycle,  when  there  are 
greater opportunities for shifting consumption and 
production patterns).
Employing  a  set  of  indicators  capturing  different 
aspects  of  the  economic  transition  can  help 
encourage and evaluate progress towards a GE. A 
well-designed set of indicators can help measure key 
interactions between the environment and economy 
at  the  macro  level,  and  guide  policy  management. 
Three principal groups of indicators relevant to the GE 
concept can be considered: 
i)  Investment, employment and output in key sectors 
of the green economy: Key sectors of the green 
economy  include  energy,  buildings,  transport, 
manufacturing,  tourism,  waste  management,  as 
well as the critical ecosystem and resource-based 
sectors of agriculture, forests, fisheries and water. 
Indicators  on  investments  in  greening  these 
sectors and the associated share in production and 
employment, directly reflect policy actions, such as 
the share of renewables in the energy mix.
ii)  Decoupling  economic  growth  from  impacts  on 
the  environment: This  includes  measures  of  the 
intensity  of  energy,  resource  and  materials  use 
and waste generation for specific sectors and the 
economy  as  a  whole,  such  as  with  energy  use 
per unit GDP, GHG emissions per unit GDP. These 
capture the outcomes or impacts of policies and 
investments to green key sectors.
 
iii) Aggregate indicators of economic progress and well 
being,  including  poverty  alleviation  and  natural 
capital  depreciation.  A  range  of  initiatives  are 
investigating alternatives to traditional economic 
measures such as GDP as the principal compass 
for economic policy making and assessment. The 
depreciation  of  ecosystems  and  natural  capital 
can be reflected in net savings rates, including for 
example an accounting of the drawdown of fossil 
fuel stocks (see Box 1).
UNEP  is  collaborating  with  key  international 
partners—including EUROSTAT7, OECD8, UN Statistical 
Division9, and the World Bank—to develop an agreed 
set  of  headline  indicators  suitable  for  measuring 
progress towards a GE.
Box 1: Measuring savings rates
The World Bank (2006) has developed measures of 
wealth and income that take resource depletion 
and  environmental  degradation  directly  into 
account.  In  a  forthcoming  analysis,  the  Bank 
identifies negative savings in excess of one per 
cent  in  around  20  developing  countries,  which 
include  some  major  oil  extractors  and  often 
highly  impoverished  countries  with  extremely 
low gross savings rates, highlighting the serious 
implications  of  rapid  resource  depletion  for 
sustainable economic growth.
6 Fullerton and Monti (2010) suggest that a carbon tax in the U.S. may be relatively more 
regressive,  because  low-income  groups  have  a  higher  propensity  to  work  in  polluting 
sectors in which wages and employment levels may fall. Further empirical analysis of this 
issue is desirable for different countries.
7 Among many efforts, EUROSTAT has developed a classification of environmental goods and 
services (EGS) within the context of the system of national accounts.
8 See OECD (2010) on indicators for measuring green growth.
9 The  UN  Statistical  Division  is  overseeing  efforts  to  revise  the  System  of  Integrated 
Environmental  and  Economic  Accounting  (SEEA)  to  be  accepted  as  an  international 
statistical standard.Driving a Green Economy 
Through Public Finance and Fiscal Policy Reform
III. Policy Reform
Issues and Strategies
A central role for fiscal policies
Fiscal  policies  have  an  important  bearing  on 
economic  growth,  and  their  effective  use  is  a 
prerequisite  for  transition  to  a  GE.  Delivering 
robust  and  fair  economic  growth  is  essential, 
particularly  given  the  critical  and  urgent  priority 
of poverty reduction and economic development 
in low-income countries. Fiscal stimulus measures 
have  played  an  important  role  during  the  crisis, 
including  in  many  instances  through  specific 
measures  to  promote  environmental  protection 
activities.  Although  difficult  to  demonstrate 
robustly  in  an  empirical  way,10  fiscal  frameworks 
conducive  to  longer-term  growth  are  likely  to 
feature  broad-based  taxation  systems  with  few 
exemptions (which are often costly to administer), 
relatively  low  marginal  rates  (World  Bank  and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers,  2008),  and  efficient 
public  expenditure  regimes.  In  terms  of  specific 
measures, studies generally emphasize the merits 
of  indirect  over  direct  taxes,  and  the  particular 
risks  associated  with  levies  on  financial  capital.11 
Reversing  wasteful  and  inefficient  subsidies,  for 
example to fossil fuels, is likely to be an important 
expenditure reform priority.
Fiscal policies are critical to fostering an efficient 
and fair transition to a GE, and likely form part 
of  an  efficiency  enhancing  tax  shift  that  can 
raise  revenue  and  promote  resource  efficiency. 
Environmental  taxes  and  charges  aimed  at 
“getting the prices right” are essential to creating 
incentives  for  less  polluting  and  more  resource-
efficient patterns of production and consumption. 
Expenditure  measures  can  also  be  harnessed  to 
promote the development of, and catalyze private 
investment in, environmental technologies, and to 
protect the incomes of the most vulnerable from 
higher  product  prices  or  shifting  employment 
patterns.  Avoiding  general  subsidies  and  other 
mechanisms,  which  undermine  the  relative  price 
changes  necessary  to  encourage  transition  to  a 
GE, is an important guiding principle in this regard 
(also because political economy factors often make 
them challenging to remove).
Good  fiscal  policy  design  generally  favours 
environmental  charges  over  green  subsidies—
especially  given  the  intense  fiscal  challenges 
in  many  countries.  Measures  to  raise  the  cost 
of  pollution  are  likely  to  create  more  effective 
incentives  for  curbing  inefficient  demand  than 
green  subsidies,12  although  broader  tax  reforms, 
for  example  to  reverse  preferential  Value  Added 
Tax (VAT) rates on fossil fuels, may be a sensible 
precursor  to  implementing  pollution  charges. 
Limited  and  temporary  subsidy  schemes  may  be 
justified where there are clear social spillovers, such 
as in the case of support to R&D in environmental 
technologies,  or  technical  barriers  to  the 
implementation  of  alternative  measures.  They 
may also be justified to promote political support 
during  the  initial  stages  of  reform.  However,  in 
addition to the fiscal costs of such policy choices 
(which fall at a time of significant budget pressures 
in  many  countries),  subsidies  risk  encouraging 
rent-seeking,  and  the  desired  behavioural  and 
investment changes are often difficult to target.
Public investment choices significantly affect the 
transition to a GE, particularly given important 
infrastructure  investment  anticipated  in  the 
coming years. Significant investment is likely to be 
required  to  meet  projected  energy  demand. The 
vast majority of this investment will take place in 
developing countries, given remaining deficiencies 
in the quality and availability of essential economic 
goods  and  services  including  energy,  water, 
sanitation  and  transport13  (although  capital 
replacement  needs  are  also  growing  in  many 
developed countries).14 These investment choices 
will have a significant bearing on future patterns 
of  economic  development  and  environmental 
10 Numerous attempts to clarify the impact of taxation and expenditure policies on growth 
have been made, but the results are broadly inconclusive and not always robust, largely due 
to the complex relationship between fiscal policy and the macro economy.
11 OECD  (2008a)  ranked  the  effects  of  different  taxes  on  growth,  suggesting  that  taxes 
on  immovable  property  are  least  damaging  (if  levied  at  moderate  levels),  followed  by 
consumption taxes, the personal income tax and, lastly, the corporate income tax.
12 OECD (2004) found that the cost of displacing GHG emissions by means of subsidies tends 
to be considerably higher than most estimates of the associated environmental damages.
13 Around 1.6 billion people (mostly in sub-Saharan Africa and southern Asia) still do not 
have access to electricity (IEA, 2008).10-11
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conditions,  especially  given  the  long-term  nature 
of the capital stock (World Bank 2010a, Chapter 4). 
Over  40  per  cent  of  GHG  emissions,  for  example, 
are  derived  from  long-lived  electricity-  and  heat-
related  capital  investments  (Shalizi  and  Lecocq, 
2009).  Poorly  designed  infrastructure  and  other 
public  investments  can  substantially  diminish  the 
responsiveness  of  economic  behaviour  to  future 
policy  reforms.  There  is  also  an  opportunity  to 
consider investment choices in developing countries 
that are less capital intensive and less focused on 
building  infrastructure.  For  instance,  the  micro-
lending  programme  of  Grameen  Shakti,  a  not-for-
profit  renewable  energy  company  in  Bangladesh, 
has offered financial packages based on installment 
payments  to  lower  recurrent  costs  to  enable 
households in rural communities install solar home 
systems. As of November 2009, more than 300,000 
such  systems  had  been  installed,  with  at  least 
660  women  installing,  repairing,  and  maintaining 
these systems, as well as producing accessories; in 
addition, more than 600 youth had been trained.15
Wider policy strategies and coordination issues
Complementary  policy  measures  are  required, 
particularly  where  market  failures  limit  the 
effectiveness  of  fiscal  incentives.  Fiscal  policy 
measures,  particularly  pollution  charges,  are 
essential  to  creating  underlying  incentives  for 
more  sustainable  economic  activity.  However, 
alone they are generally insufficient for a successful 
transition  to  a  GE.  Wider  measures,  including 
information  and  regulatory  policies,  will  likely  be 
needed. Product labels, for example, can strengthen 
behavioural  responses  to  fiscal  incentives  by 
enabling consumers to distinguish environmentally 
friendly  goods,  such  as  sustainably  caught  fish 
or  energy-efficient  appliances.  Direct  regulation 
can  help  limit  inefficiencies  arising  from  poorly 
coordinated markets. Rules governing land use can 
be employed to encourage higher density patterns 
of  urban  development,  likely  to  be  conducive  to 
greater  environmental  sustainability  (World  Bank 
2010a, Chapter 4). They may also be used to manage 
secondary  effects  of  fiscal  (or  other)  policies,  for 
example,  by  preventing  illegal  dumping  (which 
may  be  more  economically  attractive  after  the 
introduction of waste charging).
…including  legal  and  institutional  reforms, 
often closely linked with wider priorities of “good 
governance”…  Effective transition to a GE is likely 
to require a broad range of legal and institutional 
reforms. Strengthening property rights, for example, 
has  an  important  role  to  play,  for  instance  by 
limiting  the  scope  for  illegal  logging  and  other 
natural  resource  exploitation  activities.  Stable, 
long-term natural resource concessions are likely to 
help  encourage  both  environmental  sustainability 
and  economic  development.  Concessionaires  may 
have incentives either to under-invest in extraction 
technologies  if  they  fear  that  physical  capital  will 
subsequently  be  expropriated;  or,  alternatively, 
to  undertake  excessive  resource  depletion  if 
they  perceive  access  rights  to  be  uncertain  or 
temporary.16  Effective  implementation  of  policies 
affecting remotely located natural resources requires 
substantial investment and reform of relevant public 
bodies,  including  finance  ministries,  customs  and 
revenue  administrators,  as  well  as  environment 
ministries and agencies.
…as  well  as  structural  reforms  in  key  markets, 
including energy, often characterized by imperfectly 
competitive patterns of supply. Structural changes 
may  be  required  to  promote  market  access,  for 
example  by  renewable  energy  suppliers  (such 
as  through  competitive  power  purchasing 
arrangements),  and  to  enable  distributors  to 
pass  on  higher  costs  to  consumers  (for  example, 
by  reforming  end  user  price  regulations)—in 
conjunction with more systematic taxation of fossil-
fuel-based  alternatives.  Promoting  more  flexible 
labour markets is also likely to help smoothen the 
14 The UK Department for Trade and Industry (2007) for example suggested that around 30 
per cent of UK electricity generation capacity would need to be retired by 2020.
15 See http://www.gshakti.org/. 
16 Bohn  and  Deacon  (2000)  discuss  the  balance  of  these  risks  across  different  natural 
resource markets.Driving a Green Economy 
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transition  to  a  GE,  including  through  retraining 
workers in industries expected to decline in size. In 
response to the collapse of the North Atlantic cod 
stocks off the eastern coast of Canada, for example, 
the  government  introduced  a  community-based 
economic  development  programme  to  assist  in 
short-term job creation (Ruseski, 2006).
Transition to a GE is likely to require substantial 
international  cooperation,  especially  for 
transboundary  pollutants.  Climate  change,  for 
example, is a “global public bad”, making broad based 
international cooperation fundamental to its effective 
control.  Collective  management  of  shared  ocean 
fish stocks is another example where coordination 
between countries is essential. However, even in the 
case of largely national and local level environmental 
challenges,  international  cooperation  is  needed 
where  policy  responses  induce  adverse  structural 
changes in internationally traded markets (thereby 
creating  incentives  for  countries  to  protect  their 
domestic industries). There is a range of fora through 
which  international  cooperation  for  environmental 
protection  can  be  effectively  promoted.  First  and 
foremost,  negotiations  surrounding  the  various 
multilateral  environmental  agreements  (MEAs) 
provide such an opportunity. Multilateral bodies such 
as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
are likely to be heavily involved in the challenge of 
coordinated taxation of pollution from international 
transportation.
Managing distributional concerns
Fiscal policies are key to managing any adverse 
distributional  consequences  of  the  transition  to 
a GE, particularly on poor households… Taxes on 
energy, for example, are commonly considered to 
be regressive, although this depends on the detailed 
economic  circumstances  (outlined  above).17   
However,  such  effects  can  often  largely  be  offset 
through adjustments in fiscal frameworks. Metcalf 
(2007), for example, shows how this can be achieved 
through  changes  to  income  tax  credit  and  social 
security payments in the U.S. Lump sum transfers, 
such  as  winter  fuel  supplements  to  pensioners 
in the UK, have also been utilized. However, such 
adjustments need to be carefully designed to target 
those most affected. 
…reversing  environmentally  harmful  subsidies, 
and  exploiting  opportunities  for  more  targeted 
forms  of  compensation,  will  be  critical  in 
many  developing  countries.  Although  capacity 
limitations  affect  the  feasibility  of  some  of  the 
more  sophisticated  compensation  mechanisms, 
general  price  subsidies  to  environmentally 
harmful  or  natural  resource  intensive  goods  and 
services—widely  prevalent  in  many  developing 
countries—are  an  expensive  and  poorly  targeted 
way of supporting the poor. This is because fuel and 
fuel-intensive goods account for a larger share of 
the spending of the poor, but richer social groups 
spend more on them in absolute terms. There may 
be  substantial  opportunities  for  more  targeted 
compensation  arrangements  even  in  countries 
where fiscal systems are not highly sophisticated. 
Fuel  price  increases  in  Indonesia,  for  example, 
were  introduced  in  conjunction  with  conditional 
cash  transfer  programmes  designed  to  increase 
the  education  and  health  of  poor  communities. 
Under  this  programme,  payments  were  made  to 
female household heads through local post offices 
on  the  condition  that  they  agree  to  use  health 
and education services.18 Ghana provides another 
example  where  reduced  fuel  subsidies  were 
accompanied by measures such as the elimination 
of school fees for primary and secondary education.
Strengthening  political  consensus  on  the  costs 
and benefits of a transition to a GE, and a gradual 
approach  to  implementation,  is  likely  to  help 
facilitate  effective  reform.  Given  the  ultimate 
importance of stakeholder buy-in, strong political 
consensus  on  the  case  for  reform,  supported  by 
detailed analysis on the likely economic impacts, is 
desirable. To aid this process, some countries have, 
for  example,  established  independent “Green  Tax 
Commissions”,  or  large-scale  public  consultations 
(OECD,  2001).  A  strong  communication  strategy 
is  needed  to  reassure  affected  groups  that  they 
will be supported, including through the possible 
maintenance of subsidies that are most important 
to  the  budgets  of  poor  households  in  the  short 
term,  and  through  the  progressive  redirection  of 
funds into high-priority areas for public spending, 
such  as  health  care  or  education.  Assurances  of 
fiscal neutrality have previously been an important 
component  of  some  environmental  fiscal  reform 
processes.  However,  this  may  be  less  feasible 
and  credible  given  the  currently  weak  fiscal 
17 It may also be desirable to consider the distributional consequences of environmental 
(and other) tax reforms against alternative means of meeting public revenue needs. In 
this context, removing tariffs may be a more appropriate comparator in many developing 
countries than, say, a progressive income tax.
18 This targeting scheme has also been used to design a community-based conditional cash 
transfer programme called Generasi. Hutagalung, Arif, and Suharyo (2009); Bloom (2009).12-13
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circumstances  of  many  countries,  making  greater 
emphasis  on  contributing  to  fiscal  consolidation 
potentially appropriate.Driving a Green Economy 
Through Public Finance and Fiscal Policy Reform
IV. Environmental 
and Natural Resource 
Taxation
Role and experiences of green taxation
“Green”  taxes  and  charges  are  an  essential 
element  of  policy  frameworks  to  encourage 
transition to a GE… By increasing the relative cost 
of  polluting  goods  and  services,  environmental 
taxes  are  a  powerful  policy  tool  for  encouraging 
more  sustainable  economic  behaviour.  They 
can  be  levied  on:  natural  resources  extraction, 
such  as  forests,  fisheries,  or  mineral  deposits; 
environmentally  damaging  products  including 
fossil fuels; or harmful by-products of production 
or  consumption  such  as  industrial  pollution  or 
waste.
…and also have sound revenue-raising potential. 
The  OECD  (2010)  estimates  that  revenues  from 
environmentally-related  taxes  amount  to  about 
1.7  per  cent  of  GDP  on  average  across  member 
countries,  varying  from  about  0.7  per  cent  on 
average in North America to 2.5 per cent in Europe 
(over 90 per cent of these revenues come from taxes 
on fuels and motor vehicles).19 Moreover, their full 
revenue-raising  potential  is  currently  untapped. 
The Institute for European Environmental Policy for 
instance estimates that countries could realistically 
source  15  per  cent  of  revenues  from  green  taxes 
in  the  medium  to  long  term.20  Such  revenue 
opportunities are likely to be most robust where the 
tax base is inelastic to price changes, as is the case, 
for example, with fossil fuels.
A  number  of  developed  countries  have 
implemented  levies  on  polluting  activities, 
including  road  transportation,  energy  use  and 
waste. Denmark, Norway and Sweden are among 
the countries to have introduced environmentally-
motivated  energy  tax  reforms  since  the  1990’s. 
However,  while  motor  fuel  excises  are  by  far  the 
most  prevalent  tax  bearing  on  the  environment, 
they  are  typically  designed  to  meet  revenue  and 
other non-environmental objectives. Some national 
and  local  governments  (for  example  in  London 
and  Singapore)  have  begun  to  prefer  more  time 
and location specific road access charging to more 
specifically target growing problems of congestion. 
Various  forms  of  waste-related  charges,  including 
fees for accessing landfills, have also been levied in 
certain countries, such as the UK, Finland, Sweden 
and Denmark. 
While  concrete  evaluations  are  scarce,  there  is 
growing  evidence  of  the  likely  effectiveness  of 
these environmental tax reforms: 
•   Barker and others (2009) concluded that energy 
tax reforms in some European countries improved 
environmental  sustainability,  lowering  current 
GHG emissions by around six per cent in the case 
of Sweden and Finland, and by two-to-three per 
cent in Germany and Denmark.
•   The  EU  implemented  an  Emissions  Trading 
Scheme  (ETS)  in  2005.  However,  experiences 
with  this  innovative  instrument  have  so  far 
been mixed. It likely reduced GHG emissions by 
around 40-50 MtCO2 in 2008 (World Bank, 2009). 
However,  supply  probably  exceeded  demand 
for permits (the market was “long”) in 2009, due 
to the effects of the economic crisis on energy 
demand (World Bank, 2010b).
•  In  road  transportation,  largely  tax-induced 
increases  in  fuel  prices  in  Germany  were 
19 However, revenues from such taxes have generally declined slightly as a proportion of 
GDP. This reflects both a fall in the real value of fuel excises in a number of key countries, and 
the drop in demand for fuel in response to recent high oil prices.
20 Bassi, ten Brink, Pallemaerts, and Homeyer (2009). 14-15
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associated with a 13 per cent fall in fuel demand in 
the period 1997-2006 (Barker and others, 2009). 
•   Levies on waste-water effluent, and accompanying 
measures,  are  thought  to  have  reduced  water 
pollution in the Netherlands by nearly a half during 
the  1970’s  (Green  Fiscal  Commission,  2009).  More 
recently,  the  Netherlands  introduced  high  taxes 
on  landfills.  As  a  result,  less  than  two  per  cent  of 
household waste is disposed of in this way (compared 
to rates as high as 75 per cent in some other EU 
countries) (Green Fiscal Commission, 2009).
However,  many  reforms  have  been  weakened 
by  exemptions  and  rate  reductions,  often  due  to 
political economy concerns over adverse effects on 
key industries. A major concern is that environmental 
tax reforms will hamper some industrial producers, 
particularly energy intensive firms that are exposed 
to significant levels of international trade in materials 
such  as  aluminium,  steel,  paper,  and  cement.  An 
OECD (2001) study shows, for example, that taxation 
of  energy  products  is  patchy,  particularly  for  fuels 
such as coal, and includes a litany of exemptions and 
rate reductions for special interest groups. Indeed, the 
study found that tax revenues from coal, coke, heavy 
fuel oil and electricity production were “close to zero”. 
The economic impacts of environmental tax reforms 
are  also  likely  to  depend  on  how  the  resulting 
revenues are used, although empirical evidence on 
this point is scant. In theory, the adverse economic 
effects  of  more  expensive  environmentally  harmful 
goods and services will be offset, at least partially, if 
revenues are used to reduce other more distortionary 
forms of taxation, for example on capital or labour 
(Goulder,  1995).  Such  theories  have  been  put  into 
practice  by  some  countries,  for  instance,  Finland, 
Sweden and the Netherlands elected to compensate 
households  through  reduced  income  tax  rates. 
Denmark,  Germany,  and  the  UK  reduced  social 
security payments for employers and/or employees. 
In  some  cases,  the  extent  of  these  tax  swaps  was 
relatively  significant.  Germany,  for  example,  shifted 
around three per cent of total tax revenue away from 
fossil fuels in this way in the period 1996–1999 (IMF, 
2008).  However,  there  is  currently  limited  evidence 
on  the  macroeconomic  benefits  of  such  measures, 
which depend on the extent to which the burden of 
a particular environmental charge can be shifted to 
factors other than labour, but this does not suggest 
strong employment gains.21 
Levies on natural resource extraction have become 
increasingly  prevalent  and  are  a  major  focus  for 
policy reform in many developing countries… 
•   Forestry:  Charges  on  forest  resources,  including 
through  concession  rights,  felling  (“stumpage”) 
fees, and levies on timber exports, apply in many 
countries.  However,  illegal  logging  and  corrupt 
revenue  management  remain  widespread 
challenges  to  effective  poverty  reduction  and 
sustainable  forest  management,  particularly 
in  developing  countries.  Some  have  sought  to 
implement fiscal (alongside regulatory and legal) 
reforms in response. Cameroon, for example, chose 
to  auction,  rather  than  negotiate  privately  with 
logging companies, long-term forest concessions 
in 1996 in an effort to extract greater rents and 
limit corruption opportunities, a trend observed in 
other countries, including Liberia.22
•   Fisheries: Fisheries represents another sector where 
levies have been used. For instance, Namibia for 
example instituted a new policy framework during 
21 See, for example, Carraro and others (1996).
22 In theory, provided that markets for concessions are transparent and liquid, auctioning 
of rights is likely to maximize revenues (although downward pressures on other taxes, such 
as “stumpage” fees might be expected). Secure, long-term patterns of tenure are likely 
necessary  (to  complement  regulatory  arrangements)  to  encourage  concessionaries  to 
employ more sustainable logging practices.Driving a Green Economy 
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the 1990’s to effectively manage its fish resources, 
which included quota- (relating to catch levels for 
particular species) and license-based fees. Senegal, 
Mauritania  and  Guinea  Bissau  are  among  the 
countries that have sought improved terms as part 
of  international  fishing  agreements.  Mauritania 
increased its financial compensation by around 60 
per cent compared with previous agreements with 
the EU (now amounting to about 30 per cent of 
total public revenues) (OECD, 2005, Chapter 6).
•   Mineral and Petroleum Resources: Many developing 
countries  depend  crucially  on  revenues  from 
extractive  industries.  In  Africa,  for  example,  at 
least 70 per cent of total government revenues 
come  from  the  petroleum  sector  in  Algeria, 
Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Libya, and Nigeria (IMF, 2010). A number 
of countries sought to revise fiscal arrangements 
in response to the commodity price boom over 
roughly five years leading up to 2008. Mongolia 
and  Zambia,  for  example,  introduced  windfall 
taxes  on  certain  mineral  resources  during  this 
period (IMF, 2010).
…others  have  also  sought  to  implement 
environmental  taxes,  including  on  industrial 
pollution. As with developed countries, excises on 
fuels,  particularly  for  road  transportation,  are  the 
most widespread taxes bearing on the environment 
in  developing  countries.  Petroleum  taxes  account 
for  about  six  per  cent  of  total  revenues  in  Kenya, 
for  example  (GtZ,  2008).  However,  a  number  of 
developing  countries  have  implemented  broader 
environmental tax frameworks. China, for example, 
has  developed  an  extensive  system  of  charges 
since  the  late  1970’s,  which  raised  over  US$  2 
billion in revenues by 1994 (OECD, 2005). Measures 
to  discourage  sulphur  dioxide  (SO2)  emissions, 
including  higher  charges  on  electricity  produced 
without desulphurization technologies, have been an 
important element of this framework, contributing 
to  declining  emissions  of  around  1.8  million  tons 
per  year  annually  (GtZ,  2008).  World  Bank  (2000) 
identifies  pollution  charges  as  having  effectively 
reduced  industrial  emissions  in  other  developing 
countries, including the Philippines and Colombia.
Earmarking environmental revenues has featured 
widely in both developed and developing countries. 
The  underlying  objective  of  environment  levies  to 
change economic behaviour, together with pressures 
to  compensate  the  most  affected  households  and 
firms,  has  resulted  in  widespread  earmarking  of 
green tax revenues. In the U.S., for example, fuel tax 
revenues are principally dedicated to highway funds. 
In  the  EU,  over  90  per  cent  of  potential  revenues 
from emissions trading have so far been transferred 
as compensation to firms, and half of future auction 
revenues are due to be allocated to funding climate 
change related policy goals (IMF, 2008). A range of 
earmarks are also observed in developing countries. 
Revenue from the Fisheries User Levy in Uganda is 
primarily used to finance sustainable fishing practices, 
while most environmental tax revenues in Sri Lanka 
are allocated to various subsidy programmes (GtZ, 
2008). While such links may increase the acceptability 
of  environmental  policy  reform,  and  help  boost 
available resources for related public spending, their 
economic  foundations  are  generally  weak  as  tight 
earmarking  can  excessively  constrain  the  public 
finances.23
Policy design and administration
Pollution as a tax base
A  “green  tax”  will  be  more  efficient  the  more 
closely  targeted  it  is  to  the  underlying  source  of 
the  environmental  damage.  Environmental  levies 
should  ideally  be  imposed  directly  on  pollutants, 
which are often not readily observable. This makes 
it desirable to levy on goods and services that are 
closely  correlated  with  environmental  damages. 
Taxing  fossil  fuels  in  proportion  to  their  carbon 
context,  for  example,  is  likely  to  be  an  efficient 
base, because emissions are fixed in proportion to 
the volume of fuel combusted.24 By contrast, taxing 
fertilizers  is  likely  to  be  a  relatively  less  efficient 
means  of  controlling  water  pollution  since  this 
depends  also  on  the  particular  farming  methods 
employed and would therefore require data on the 
volume of nitrates and other pollutants in the water 
run-off from individual farm holdings. 
However,  administrative  weaknesses  often 
necessitate  the  use  of  less  well-targeted  bases. 
Sophisticated systems of environmental taxation are 
generally beyond the capacity of most developing 
countries. Administration of certain natural resource 
taxes often presents significant monitoring and other 
23 Its feasibility would likely diminish if environmental taxes reached their full potential in 
the coming years since these would exceed a reasonable budgetary share for environmental 
protection measures.
24  There  might  be  a  strong  technical  argument  for  a  tax  credit  where  emissions  are 
sequestered,  for  example,  using  carbon  capture  and  storage  (CCS)  technologies.  Note, 
however, that CCS schemes tend to be very energy-intensive.16-17
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implementation challenges. In forestry, for example, 
it may be simpler to levy concessionary areas, and/or 
timber exports, rather than actual extraction through 
“stumpage” fees, which require close monitoring in 
often remote forest locations. In road transportation 
markets  it  may  be  more  pragmatic  to  harness 
motor  fuel  and  vehicle  excises  than  complex  road 
pricing arrangements to control congestion costs.25 
The UK, for example, is reforming its Air Passenger 
Duty so the levy more closely reflects the distance 
flown  and  incentivizes  higher  load  factors.  In  the 
EU, governments approved a law in 2008 to include 
aviation  in  the  EU-ETS  starting  in  2012,  effectively 
charging airlines with operations in the EU for their 
GHG emissions.
Reform  of  administrative  capacity  is  therefore 
often  essential  to  more  effective  environmental 
fiscal reform. Local environmental agencies, as well 
as revenue and customs administration authorities, 
are often under-resourced in developing countries, 
hampering  the  effectiveness  of  environmental 
charging.  Recent  studies  in Tanzania,  for  example, 
suggest large revenue shortfalls in both forest and 
fisheries  sectors  (Milledge  and  others,  2007;  FAO, 
2004). Enhanced revenue and customs administration 
capacity may also be required, for example, to reduce 
under-reporting  of  natural  resource  exports,  and 
limit tax planning and evasion by firms.26 Improved 
monitoring  by  local  environment  agencies  is  also 
urgently required in many countries to facilitate more 
effective policy design, enforcement and subsequent 
evaluation.  Monitoring  can  also  enable  the 
implementation of more sophisticated “downstream” 
pollution charges, such as on industrial wastewater.27 
Incentives for improved enforcement, and reduced 
risk of corruption, may also be encouraged through 
the  separation  of  monitoring  and  collection 
functions. 
Determining a tax rate
Economic  theory  on  the  optimal  environmental 
charge  is  often  difficult  to  put  into  practice.  In 
theory,  a  corrective  tax  should  fully  internalize 
relevant environmental costs. However, as outlined 
previously, these are difficult to assess in practice. A 
few studies have taken up the challenge: the marginal 
social cost of carbon, for example, is estimated to be 
on the order of US$15–US$60 per ton of carbon (/
tC), equivalent to around US$2–US$8 per barrel of 
oil (although estimates by the Stern Review (2007) 
are much higher, on the order of US$312/tC) (IMF, 
2008). For comparison, this is lower than the current 
EU-ETS  forward  for  delivery  in  late  2010,  which  is 
around €60/tC. Figure 1 below draws on analysis by 
Ley and Boccardo (2010) of the optimal fuel excise 
for  selected  countries,  accounting  for  a  range  of 
environmental  and  social  costs  (including  those 
associated with accidents and congestion), as well 
as  public  revenues  needs.  They  estimate  that  six 
countries, accounting for more than 40 per cent of 
transport oil GHG emissions, have fuel excises, which 
are below desirable levels.
Figure 1: Comparing current and “optimal” motor 
fuel taxes in selected countries, US cents/gallon.  
 
A potentially more pragmatic approach is to choose 
a  tax  rate  sufficient  to  effect  real  transition  to  a 
GE. In the absence of rigorous and widely available 
assessments of the marginal social costs associated 
with  the  consumption  or  production  of  particular 
economic goods and services, an alternative approach 
is to choose a tax rate which is likely to induce desired 
changes in investment and behaviour.28 In the case of 
climate change mitigation, for example, tax rates on 
the order of US$150/tC (equivalent to around US$20 
per barrel of oil) are widely considered necessary to 
promote substitution from fossil fuels to renewable 
energies  (Heal,  2009).  Even  where  initial  tax  rates 
Source: Ley and Boccardo (2010).
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25 Vehicle excises and circulation taxes have no impact on marginal incentives to drive but 
may affect vehicle numbers.  
26 For example, through the creation of large taxpayer revenue units, with specialist capacity 
relating to fiscal administration of extractive industries.
27 This typically requires collecting data on both the concentration and volume of discharges 
in order to avoid perverse incentives such as diluting effluent.
28 Baumol and Oates (1989) formally establish a more limited notion of optimality, which 
determines the overall objective and then sets a tax to realize this at minimum cost.Driving a Green Economy 
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are  lower  than  the  marginal  costs  of  abatement, 
such  levies  may  establish  an  important  signal  to 
households and firms regarding the responsibilities 
for, and consequences of, environmentally harmful 
patterns of consumption and production. 
Policy-makers should also focus on strengthening 
a  credible  time  path  for  pollution  tax  rates, 
particularly  where  transition  to  a  GE  requires 
long-term  investment  solutions.  Environmentally 
sustainable forms of energy, water and other physical 
capital  often  have  long  payback  periods,  making 
investment choices more sensitive to future rather 
than present environmental (or other) tax rates. In 
many cases, it is desirable for pollution charges to 
rise steadily over time as part of a gradual transition 
to a GE. However, a fragile economic environment 
warrants some caution before implementing rapid or 
unexpected increases in tax rates (Jones and Keen, 
2009).29 Instilling the necessary investor confidence 
in  stricter  future  fiscal  arrangements  is  inherently 
challenging.  The  UK,  for  example,  adopted  a  fuel 
price escalator during the 1990s, which committed 
to increasing the real cost of motoring each year. As 
a minimum, though, relevant excise rates should be 
indexed to preserve their real incentive value.
Choosing an instrument
Core  instruments  for  pollution  charging  include 
taxes and cap-and-trade schemes. An environmental 
tax, for example, is simply one levied at a specific rate 
on some pollutant. Under cap-and-trade, some fixed 
total of emission rights is issued, and firms trade to 
obtain  the  permits  they  need  with  the  price  paid 
being serving, in effect, as the pollution charge. It is 
also possible to combine characteristics of the two 
measures, such as through a cap-and-trade with a 
maximum price (at which unlimited permits would 
be issued).
These  measures  are  equivalent  if  emission  rights 
are auctioned and the structure of abatement costs 
is known… Under these assumptions, the effect of 
a tax, on both emissions levels and revenue, can be 
replicated by setting the total amount of emissions 
under a cap-and-trade market equal to the resulting 
emissions under the tax. In this way, each firm will 
emit the same amount and the government would 
collect  the  same  revenue.  However,  in  practice, 
emission permits are often allocated free of charge, 
which means the government foregoes revenue that 
it would collect under a pollution tax.
…but real differences emerge when the costs and 
benefits of policies are uncertain. This makes it likely 
that policy-makers will set the tax, or the emissions cap, 
at the wrong level. However, the policy implications 
depend on the specific nature of the environmental 
problem, and its technological solutions. Emissions 
trading  may  be  preferable  for  chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs), for example, because setting a cap too low 
would be fairly inexpensive relative to the optimal 
policy.  This  is  because  technical  substitutes  are 
readily available, and the scheme would likely still 
confer  sound  benefits  through  additional  ozone 
protection. By contrast, too rapid a reduction in GHG 
emissions  from  energy  would  be  expensive  given 
currently  immature  renewable  alternatives,  as  well 
as the potential need to scrap existing capital. Also, 
the environmental benefits of deeper cuts over any 
short time period would be limited given that the 
accumulated stock of GHGs contributes to climate 
change. Given this, economists tend to favour taxes 
in this latter context.30 
…or  where  emissions  rights  are  awarded  free  of 
charge, as has so far been observed. Free transfer of 
emission rights does not in itself diminish the incentive 
to reduce emissions, since the possibility of selling 
permits creates an opportunity cost to polluting. But 
the fiscal costs are significant in some cases. Tens of 
billions of dollars have so far been lost annually in 
the EU-ETS (IMF, 2008), and the levels of free transfers 
envisaged in previous drafts of US climate legislation 
could result in fiscal losses of around US$670 billion 
between  2011-19  (Congressional  Budget  Office, 
2009).  In  addition,  abatement  incentives  could  be 
weakened if investments that do not contribute to 
reduced  emissions  are  expected  to  attract  larger 
volumes of free permits in the future. 
This policy choice also has important implications 
for  the  cross-country  distribution  of  revenues. 
Revenues  from  an  emissions  tax  would  likely  be 
retained in the country where it is levied, commonly 
presumed to be the nation in which a pollutant is 
emitted.  However,  under  international  emissions 
trading, revenues would likely be raised in countries 
where  pollution  reduction  is  relatively  cheap, 
through the sale of emission rights to those where 
it is more costly. The extent of the resulting transfers 
29 Theoretically the optimal pollution charge should rise over time if marginal damages 
today  are  lower  than  the  average  (present  value)  of  marginal  damages  from  future 
emissions. Acegmoglu and others (2009) argue that an emissions charge may only need to 
be temporary. However, their representation of the economy likely understates the extent 
of real rigidities in technology markets and the commercial advantage currently enjoyed by 
many brown technologies, particularly those using fossil fuels.
30  Weitzman (1974) formalizes the argument surrounding policy efficiency under uncertainty 
in terms of the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and costs curves. 18-19
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depends on the nature of the initial endowment of 
rights. The allocation of rights thus becomes a key 
design  variable,  linking  both  efficiency  and  equity 
for international environmental challenges such as 
climate  change.  Broad  country  cooperation  lowers 
the cost of pollution controls, but this depends on 
individual countries having the necessary incentives 
(which  are  affected  by  expected  value  of  permit 
sales.)
Taxes  may  be  simpler  to  administer  than  permit 
markets. Pollution taxes can often be implemented 
using  existing  systems  of  indirect  tax  collection 
already  in  place  in  many  countries.  By  contrast, 
emissions  trading  requires  a  new  apparatus  to 
administer  a  baseline,  allocate  emissions  rights, 
and verify and enforce compliance. The EU-ETS has 
experienced a number of administrative challenges. 
Its  first  phase  was  ultimately “long”  partly  due  to 
insufficient  installation  level  data.  Some  of  these 
challenges can be addressed by auctioning emission 
rights  (largely  obviating  the  need  for  detailed 
firm  level  data)  and,  where  possible,  by  imposing 
obligations  on  “upstream”  producers  (such  as  oil 
refineries),  thereby  substantially  reducing  the 
number of separately regulated entities.31 
Key green tax reform priorities
Broader  and  more  robust  taxation  of  major 
markets  affecting  environmental  sustainability 
is  a  key  objective.  Steps  in  this  direction  include 
removing current preferential rates and exemptions 
on  environmentally  harmful  goods  (for  example, 
lower  VAT  rates  on  energy  products)  and 
restructuring  existing  taxes  to  better  reflect  social 
and environmental costs. Exploiting potentially new 
bases for specific environmental charging is a further 
priority  including,  for  example,  on  energy,  water, 
waste,  certain  chemicals,  and  exhaustible  natural 
resources. 
More  rational  taxation  of  fossil  fuels  is  urgently 
needed, both to limit climate change and control 
wider social and environmental costs. Fossil  fuels 
are  substantially  under-taxed  in  many  countries 
(Ley and Boccardo, 2010). Many tax systems include 
substantial  exemptions  for  coal,  and  are  unduly 
favourable to diesel. Raising and systemizing rates 
across fuel types according to their carbon content, 
and  removing  major  exemptions,  are  therefore 
critical priorities. Fiscal consolidation and heightened 
concerns regarding climate change have prompted 
renewed  interest  in  such  measures.  New  carbon 
taxes  have  recently  been  introduced,  or  are  being 
developed, in countries such as Iceland and Ireland, 
as well as in provinces such as British Colombia, and 
are being discussed in France and Japan. The new UK 
government has also proposed to reform the Climate 
Change  Levy  from  an  energy-  to  a  carbon-related 
fiscal base.
Full  auctioning  of  emission  rights,  and  efforts  to 
promote price stability, is critical where emissions 
trading is the preferred fiscal instrument. Realizing 
the full fiscal benefits of emissions trading schemes 
requires that rights be sold, not allocated for free. 
Policy-makers  should  consider  phasing  out  free 
permit allocations, for example as part of emerging 
carbon markets, where these cannot be completely 
avoided for reasons of political economy. It is also 
desirable to limit price uncertainty (which causes risk 
averse households and firms to demand higher rates 
of  return  on  investments  in  pollution  controls)  by 
ensuring broad sectoral coverage for any scheme.32
Congestion  charging  may  be  an  important 
element  of  more  comprehensive  energy  price 
rationalization in the longer term, particularly in 
developed countries. Congestion (as well as accident 
and  other  social  costs)  is  only  weakly  correlated 
with  fuel  use.  As  relevant  technologies  advance, 
some countries may wish to implement congestion 
charging. Congestion charging in London is thought 
to have reduced the vehicle volumes by around 15 
per  cent  in  2003-2004  (Green  Fiscal  Commission, 
2009).  The  Eddington  Review  (2006),  for  example, 
emphasized the importance of controlling spiralling 
future congestion costs in the UK. This may facilitate 
a  restructuring—and  in  some  cases  perhaps 
lowering—of  fuel  excises  to  focus  them  on  the 
objectives they are best served to address, such as 
climate change mitigation. 
Robust  and  stable  fiscal  frameworks  to  both 
capture  resource  rents,  and  promote  investment 
in  sustainable  resource  extraction,  are  critical 
in  resource-rich  countries…  Although  a  greater 
proportion of natural resource rents are sometimes 
being captured by many developing countries (for 
example in some international fisheries agreements), 
in other cases the government “take” remains low. In 
31 In some markets, however, such as agriculture, compliance with GHG emissions trading 
would likely need to be imposed on the downstream source. 
32 EU-ETS permit prices fell by around 70 per cent between July 2009 and February 2010 
(Jones and Keen, 2009).Driving a Green Economy 
Through Public Finance and Fiscal Policy Reform
forestry, for example, Brazil and Indonesia capture less 
than 15 per cent per cent of potential rents, perhaps 
rising to around 30 per cent per cent in Gabon and 
Laos (OECD, 2005). Stable fiscal terms are most likely 
to encourage often much-needed investment. This 
would tend to argue for tax frameworks that are both 
flexible and progressive in response to uncertain and 
volatile  output  prices  and  production  costs.  Such 
frameworks are achievable through direct taxation of 
rents and corporate profitability.
…including  extending  fiscal  arrangements  to 
help  reduce  deforestation.  Deforestation,  for 
example, accounts for around 17 per cent of global 
emissions  and  should  afford  cheap  abatement 
opportunities.    However,  implementing  incentive 
schemes is hard because baseline rates of emissions 
from deforestation are difficult to determine, while 
monitoring and enforcement are also problematic. 
Sustained  efforts  will  be  required  to  develop  the 
necessary  administrative  capacity,  and  mobilize 
sufficient resources, including through international 
support.  Implementing  economic  incentives  for 
the  Reducing  Emissions  from  Deforestation  and 
Forest Degradation (REDD) regime may be the best 
current opportunity to facilitate the transition to a 
GE in forestry. Successful implementation of REDD 
incentives could open up the prospect of new types 
of forest-related jobs, livelihoods and revenues, but 
will require compliance standards that support the 
co-production of local benefits with global benefits, 
as  well  as  effective  systems  for  the  local  control 
of  forests,  to  ensure  these  livelihood  benefits  are 
realized. The recent pledge of an additional US$1 
billion  from  Norway  is  a  promising  start  in  this 
regard.33
 
More  effective  use  of  environmental  and 
natural  resource  charging  warrants  improved 
administrative capacity. Taxes on natural resources 
and environmental markets (with the exception, for 
example, of energy excises) are typically challenging 
to administer particularly for developing countries, 
given  their  remote  location  and  monitoring  and 
compliance requirements. Investing in the capacity 
of  environment  agencies  and  tax  administrators 
is  therefore  an  essential  complement  to  greater 
and  more  effective  use  of  environmental  charges. 
Revenue  collection  departments  in  resource-rich 
countries,  for  example,  likely  require  specialist 
capacity relating to extractive industries.
International  tax  coordination  is  desirable, 
particularly where the burden of green taxes falls 
heavily  on  internationally  traded  goods.  Failure 
to  coordinate  environmental  charges  in  response 
to  global  challenges  such  as  climate  change  will 
increase the overall costs (for example, by missing 
out  on  potential  gains  to  trade  arising  from 
international  differences  in  the  marginal  costs  of 
mitigation). Such a failure may also undermine the 
effectiveness  of  any  measures  due  to  emissions-
generating  activities  shifting  to  nonparticipant 
countries, or because downward pressure on world 
fuel  prices  stimulates  energy  demand.  However, 
even  for  national-  and  local-level  environmental 
challenges,  some  degree  of  international 
cooperation  is  needed  where  the  burden  falls 
heavily  on  internationally  traded  goods  (thereby 
creating  incentives  for  countries  to  protect  their 
domestic industries). One response to international 
tax competition is to seek agreement on minimum 
tax levels. The EU has sought to manage downward 
pressures  on  rates  by  adopting  minimum  rates, 
which  is  potentially  less  constraining  than  “tax 
harmonization” in that it provides some protection 
to countries wishing to set relatively high rates while 
allowing  them  flexibility  to  increase  their  rates. 
It  may  also  have  sound  economic  logic  (differing 
levels  of  tax  and  market  distortions  may  justify 
some variance in emissions prices across countries). 
International  reforms  are  required  to  promote 
trade  in  environmental  goods  and  services,  and 
potentially  also  to  encourage  international  tax 
cooperation.  The  international  trading  system 
can have significant influence on green economic 
activity,  enabling  or  obstructing  the  flow  of 
green  goods,  technologies  and  investments. 
Renewed  efforts  to  coordinate  reduced  trade 
barriers  for  environmental  goods  and  services 
through  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO) 
Doha  Round  are  therefore  warranted.  Border  tax 
adjustments  have  been  raised  as  one  option  to 
help promote international cooperation by limiting 
competitiveness  risks  arising  from  differential 
taxation  of  energy  (Stiglitz,  2006).  However, 
such  instruments  risk  being  misused  to  disguise 
protectionist  measures  and  may  or  may  not  be 
WTO-consistent.34  Careful  consideration  of  these 
and other detailed design issues is therefore highly 
desirable  before  determining  whether  to  utilize 
such fiscal policy options.35 
33 Letter of Intent between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government 
of  the  Republic  of  Indonesia  on “Cooperation  on  reducing  greenhouse  gas  emissions 
from  deforestation  and  forest  degradation”,  May  26  2010.  http://www.norway.or.id/
PageFiles/404362/Letter_of_Intent_Norway_Indonesia_26_May_2010.pdf
34 See WTO-UNEP (2009) for a discussion of these issues.
35 For example, it may be difficult to assess the volume and/or value of carbon levies paid 
in overseas production processes, which potentially span a number of different countries. 
Determining the appropriate adjustment may be particularly difficult in the case of permit 
trading given price volatility. 20-21
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Coordinated  taxation  of  international  «bunker» 
fuels is also a key objective. International aviation 
and  shipping  is  largely  uncharged  for  (Keen  and 
Strand, 2007). There is little economic rationale for 
this anomalous tax treatment either from a fiscal or 
environmental  standpoint.  Significant  international 
cooperation would be required to achieve coordinated 
taxation of aviation or shipping. In the short term, 
it may be desirable to reform taxes on tickets and 
cargo  to  better  proxy  the  environmental  damages 
associated with international transportation.Driving a Green Economy 
Through Public Finance and Fiscal Policy Reform
V. Green Expenditure 
Policies
Experiences with “green fiscal” stimulus 
Environmental  measures  have  been  a  valuable 
part of fiscal stimulus packages.  Although  their 
effects  are  uncertain  and  design-dependent, 
(ex  ante)  analysis  suggests  that  environmental 
support programmes could have strong multiplier 
effects, and may also appeal to policy-makers to 
the extent that they foster domestic demand more 
than  would,  for  example,  general  consumption 
or  income  support.  Houser  and  Heilmayr  (2009) 
estimate  that  a “green”  stimulus  package  in  the 
United States could produce roughly four times as 
many  jobs  as  revenue-equivalent  temporary  tax 
rebates. A UNEP (2009a) study also emphasized the 
potential merits of environmental programmes over 
traditional areas of stimulus support, such as road 
construction  or  fossil  fuel  energy  programmes.36 
However,  available  evidence  on  the  effects  of 
green programmes in developing countries is more 
limited. Schwartz and others (2009) find increases 
in  direct  employment  arising  from  water  and 
sanitation investments in Latin America. 
Stimulus  funding  allocated  to  environmental 
goals  has  been  significant,  although  actual 
disbursements  have  been  slow.  According  to 
UNEP  (2010),  around  US$188  billion  in  public 
support  to  clean  energy  has  been  pledged 
as  part  of  fiscal  stimulus  plans.  The  US,  China 
and  the  Republic  of  Korea  account  for  around 
US$67,  US$47,  and  US$25  billion  of  this  total 
respectively. Resources have also been allocated 
by a number of countries to other environmental 
goals,  such  as  forest  restoration  and  improved 
water  and  sanitation  provision.  However,  there 
is  some  evidence  to  suggest  that  actual  levels 
of disbursement may have only been partial. For 
example,  UNEP  (2010)  estimates  that  less  than 
ten  per  cent  of  the  total  allocated  funds  came 
online during 2009 (although significantly more 
financing support is expected to flow during 2010 
and 2011).
Nevertheless,  much  stimulus  support  has  gone 
to  brown  technologies.  Stimulus  programmes  in 
many  countries,  including  the  extensive  package 
implemented by China have been heavily focused 
on  traditional  forms  of  infrastructure  provision, 
particularly road building projects (for which around 
US$270 billion has been allocated across the G-20 
(Jones and Keen, 2009)). Such expenditures would 
likely deliver significant structural benefits, provided 
projects  are  well-designed.  But  they  may  also 
perpetuate and lock in excessive levels of demand 
for road transport (especially given often weak fuel 
pricing  policies),  thereby  constraining  the  future 
transition to a GE in the longer term. 
There  may  be  large  differences  in  the  quantity 
and  quality  of  jobs  created  across  different 
“green”  stimulus  programmes.  There  is  currently 
no  rigorous  ex  post  analysis  of  the  employment 
effects  of  specific  environmental  stimulus 
programmes.  However,  basic  microeconomic 
theory might suggest a preference for supporting 
energy  efficiency  measures,  which  reduce  energy 
costs, over renewable energy technologies, which 
are  likely  to  increase  energy  prices,  to  the  extent 
that  government  support  does  not  fully  cover 
production  cost  increases. Theory  also  suggests  a 
preference for supporting certain labour intensive 
environmental cleanup operations, which are likely 
to  confer  some  productivity  benefits,  including 
through  improvements  in  human  health  (Strand 
and  Toman,  2010).  Analysis  by  UNEP  (2009a) 
suggests that building insulation and other energy 
efficiency programmes would likely generate more 
employment than support to renewables. However, 
there may also be large differences in the stimulus 
benefits across particular renewables technologies. 
Renner, Sweeney and Kubit (2008) show that support 
to biomass and solar thermal industries, for example, 
could create more jobs than solar photovoltaics or 
wind  programmes  in  China.  However,  it  is  worth 
36  Suggesting,  for  example,  that  photovoltaics  create  over  50  per  cent  more  jobs  than 
highway  construction;  biomass  generates  nearly  twice  as  many  jobs  as  health  care; 
insulation programmes create nearly three times as many jobs as municipal infrastructure; 
and that mass transit creates more than four times as many jobs as utility programmes.22-23
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noting that the quality of the resulting jobs may also 
differ markedly. Employment in biomass production, 
for instance, is likely to be in low-skilled agriculture, 
with  limited  scope  for  technological  enhancement 
and learning effects for the individual workers, while 
employment  in  solar  photovoltaics  (which  typically 
requires a higher level of technological know-how) is 
likely to yield higher wages.37
From stimulus to sustainability
In  some  cases,  climate-related  stimulus  spending 
could  help  smooth  the  longer-term  transition  to  a 
GE. Energy efficiency programmes, such as measures 
to support improved building insulation, for example, 
may not only support the macro economy by lowering 
household  energy  costs  (and  fostering  demand  for 
hard  hit  construction  and  maintenance  services),  but 
also reduce vulnerability to future energy or emissions 
price increases. Market failures in the building sector, 
for  example—including  incomplete  capitalization  of 
energy-saving investments in property and rental values, 
due  to  their  nontransparent  nature—may  otherwise 
continue  to  constrain  adjustments  by  landlords  and 
tenants to more rational pricing of energy.
The extent of these longer-term benefits will likely 
differ across countries, but are likely to be greatest for 
those that are more vulnerable to future supply and 
demand shocks as a result of large accumulated debts, 
inflexible product or labour markets (and so less able 
to adjust to price shocks efficiently), or reliance on 
imported fuels (particularly if sourced from politically 
or economically unstable markets). However, Strand 
and Toman (2010) emphasize that trade-offs are also 
likely  to  be  common.  Many  investments  delivering 
long-term environmental benefits—such as in public 
transport infrastructure—could have a limited short-
term impact on demand, due, for instance, to long 
project lead times.
The  implementation,  and  withdrawal,  of 
environmental  (as  with  other)  stimulus  measures 
should reflect their likely contribution to sustained 
growth  and  employment  (Jones  and  Keen,  2009). 
But the environmental benefits of many programmes 
alone are unlikely to warrant their continued support 
once demand conditions are restored (see, e.g., Box 2 
on the cash for clunkers measures). Careful monitoring 
and ongoing evaluation of these, as with all, spending 
programmes is therefore needed, including those in 
the form of tax breaks.
Box 2 : “Cash for Clunkers” 
These subsidy programmes for the purchase of new 
cars were implemented by a number of countries, 
including  the  U.S.,  France,  and  Germany.  They 
have done much to reinvigorate the automotive 
sector.  However,  from  a  purely  environmental 
perspective, they are not a good way of realizing 
fuel  efficiency  savings  (Jones  and  Keen,  2009). 
Knittel (2009) shows, for instance, that the implicit 
cost of reducing emissions from such programmes 
would likely exceed US$450/tC. Higher fuel taxes 
would  be  more  effective  in  encouraging  fewer 
vehicle  miles,  and  in  fostering  advancements  in 
“hybrids” and other fuel-efficient technologies.
Longer-term environmental expenditures
Infrastructure 
Consideration  of  the  environmental  impacts  of 
important public investments is critical. Significant 
investment  in  energy  and  other  infrastructure  is 
anticipated,  particularly  in  developing  countries, 
which is likely to have a powerful impact on future 
environmental  conditions  (see,  for  instance,  Box  3 
on  public  investment  in  green  buildings).  Energy 
distribution  and  transportation  networks,  for 
example,  are  likely  to  have  a  significant  bearing 
on  future  patterns  of  economic  development  and 
environmental  conditions  (World  Bank,  2010a, 
Chapter 4). Population centres with large road capacity 
37  The nature of labour market distortions differs across countries, affecting the preferences 
of policy makers for generating demand for particular types of employment.   Driving a Green Economy 
Through Public Finance and Fiscal Policy Reform
and  limited  mass  transit  facilities  for  example  will 
almost  inevitably  lead  to  greater  dependency  on 
private motor vehicles. Once in place, such forms of 
long-lived capital may not easily (or cost effectively) 
be adjusted at a later date, raising complex issues 
regarding the composition and timing of investment 
in the short and medium terms. 
Box 3: Public investment in buildings
Given  the  high  energy  demand  resulting  from 
buildings,  investing  in  greening  the  building 
sector  can  contribute  significantly  to  energy 
savings  and  reducing  CO2  emissions.  Greening 
the  building  sector  can  also  contribute  to  job 
creation. Governments play a lead role either by 
investing public funds directly in greening public 
buildings (offices, schools,  social housing, etc.), 
or by providing incentives – such as tax breaks 
or  low-interest  loans  –  to  ensure  that  building 
green  is  not  more  expensive  than  conventional 
construction. Publicly-funded buildings can also 
showcase  new  technologies  and  environmental 
standards, which subsequently could be adopted 
or  made  requirements  for  private  investments. 
In  Brazil,  where  the  National  Electrical  Energy 
Conservation  Programme  PROCEL  provides 
funding  for  retrofitting  government  buildings, 
140 GWh are saved yearly (UNEP, 2007). 
Incorporating  a  shadow  price  for  future 
environmental  impacts  could  improve  resource 
efficiency.  This  could  be  included  as  part  of 
environmental assessments ideally taking place for 
both policies and major projects. EU guidance on 
structural funding recommends this as part of cost-
benefit  analysis  (European  Commission,  2008).  In 
the case of climate change mitigation, for example, 
this  implies  factoring  in  plausible  assumptions  of 
more efficient carbon pricing in the coming years 
into long-term spending decisions. Although there 
remains some uncertainty surrounding the precise 
definition  of  “green”  and  “brown”  infrastructure, 
there  may  be  a  sound  economic  case  for 
adjusting the composition of some existing public 
expenditure,  such  as  through  greater  support  for 
mass transit over road building (UNEP, 2009), as an 
integral part of more environmentally sustainable 
urban planning. 
However,  additional  public  expenditure  will 
also  be  required  to  cushion  the  environmental 
burden of meeting essential development needs. 
The World Bank (2010a, Chapter 6) estimates that 
enhancing  the  resilience  of  economic  growth  in 
developing  countries  to  future  climate  change 
could cost on the order of US$75 billion per year 
until  2020.  Although  such  estimates  are  highly 
uncertain, it is clear that much of this spending—
perhaps in excess of one-half—is required for power, 
transport and water infrastructure as well as coastal 
protection, which are areas of the economy often 
heavily  dominated  by  government  involvement. 
The World Bank (2010a, Chapter 6) also estimates 
that climate change mitigation could raise financing 
needs of perhaps US$140 to US$175 billion per year 
until 2030. Even if direct government involvement 
in affected sectors were low, say just 20 per cent, 
this  would  nevertheless  still  imply  additional 
government expenditure on the order of US$30-35 
billion per year. Transfers from advanced economies 
are likely to be needed to help meet the costs of 
meeting  the  environmental  challenges  faced  by 
developing countries. The US$100 billion per year by 
2020, pledged to support climate change responses 
by developing countries as part of the Copenhagen 
Accord, could be a significant start in this regard.38  
Currently  available  finance  is  sufficient  to  meet 
only  a  small  fraction  of  these  needs.  The  World 
Bank  (2010a)  estimates  that  only  around  five  per 
cent  of  overall  long-term  climate  financing  needs 
are currently being met through a roughly equal mix 
of  international  carbon  markets  and  international 
grants. Tax based incentives—including, for example, 
incentives  implemented  through  well-functioning 
and  broad  based  international  carbon  markets—
could,  if  developed,  mobilize  private  finance  to 
meet  the  bulk  of  these  costs.  However,  a  larger 
role for public funding may be warranted, at least 
initially. Where intervention is preferred, a core policy 
choice is whether to undertake direct government 
expenditure, subsidize private investment costs, or 
share risks (some potential risk sharing instruments 
are discussed in Box 4). 
38 The “Copenhagen Accord” of 19 December 2010. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/
cop15/eng/l07.pdf24-25
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Box 4: Public risk guarantees and environmental 
policy
Governments may generally be more risk averse 
than private households and firms. This makes it 
potentially  economically  rational  to  share  some 
environmental  and  policy  risks,  such  as  through 
public  guarantees  and  forms  of  sovereign  risk 
transfer (public liabilities relating to environmental 
loans  and  investment  activities,  however,  should 
be transparently recorded).39 Caribbean countries 
for example manage hurricane risks through the 
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (IMF, 
2008).40 More general macroeconomic risks are likely 
to be a significant barrier to investment in many 
developing countries, for which limited private risk 
coverage is available. Some country risk insurance 
is currently publicly provided, for example though 
the  Multilateral  Investment  Guarantee  Agency 
of  the  World  Bank,  and  the  U.S.  Government’s 
Overseas  Private  Investment  Corporation.  This 
coverage could potentially be expanded to climate 
and other environmental investments, for instance, 
made under the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
and other multilateral financing arrangements. Risk 
sharing  arrangements  to  specific  environmental 
policy factors could also potentially be considered 
on a limited and temporary basis in the case of 
carbon pricing. Such insurance could be restricted 
to  situations  where  countries  renege  on  legal 
grandfathering  conditions,  and  support  the 
development  and  implementation  of  stronger 
developing countries’ actions (UNEP, 2009b).
The  need  for  more  and  greener  infrastructure 
presents  particular  challenges  for  policy-makers, 
given the uncertain and inflexible nature of these 
investments…  Without  significant  investment 
in  cleaner  infrastructure,  the  priorities  of  both 
advancing  human  development  and  transitioning 
to a GE may be undermined. There may be strong 
complementarities  between  these  two  objectives, 
for  example  in  the  case  of  investments  to  reduce 
inefficiently  high  levels  of  transmission  and 
distribution losses in many developing countries.41   
However, in other instances, tradeoffs may exist. It 
may be more expensive to develop a power network 
capable  of  incorporating  intermittent  supply 
sources,  such  as  many  renewable  technologies. 
Managing  these  priorities  is  highly  complex,  not 
least given the fact that such investments are long 
lived and the returns are often uncertain (Pindyck, 
2007).  Determining  the  appropriate  degree  and 
timing of coastal defence investment, for example, 
is  challenging,  given  the  uncertainty  surrounding 
future sea level rise due to climate change and the 
challenge and additional expense of making ex post 
adjustments to such forms of capital. 
… the practical implications of these issues have 
not yet been properly determined. Nevertheless, it 
is clear that such considerations create a preference, 
where feasible, for gradual and flexible investment 
strategies. However, this is often not possible in the 
case  of  infrastructure  provision,  especially  where 
there are significant pressures to improve deficiencies 
in  the  supply  of  public  goods.  In  such  instances, 
careful consideration of future environmental risks 
and the uncertainty surrounding these is essential. 
Some  investments  may  need  to  be  reconsidered, 
such as construction in low lying areas, and others 
adjusted,  such  as  more  efficient  water  systems  in 
cases where greater resource scarcity is anticipated.
Governments can help deliver clean infrastructure 
and  other  public  service  needs  by  incorporating 
environmental  objectives  into  co-financing 
arrangements,  such  as  private  finance  initiatives. 
Such  financing  arrangements  offer  substantial 
opportunities  for  improving  the  efficiency  of 
infrastructure  and  other  public  services  provision, 
including  the  distribution  of  risk.  Relevant  assets 
and liabilities—including future service payments—
should  nevertheless  be  properly  recorded  in  the 
public  accounts.  However,  delivery  partners  may 
fail to consider sufficiently environmental and social 
priorities  without  explicit  contractual  obligations 
in  these  areas.  It  may  also  be  desirable  to  review 
environmental  risk  exposure  to  the  efficiency  of 
public  investments  delivered  through  existing  co-
financing arrangements, for example to ensure port 
facilities are sufficiently equipped in the face of rising 
sea levels.
Sustainable Public Procurement (SPP)
Governments  can  help  drive  demand  for,  and 
advancement  in,  environmental  technologies 
through SPP. The value of government purchases of 
goods  and  services  is  often  significant,  potentially 
39  For example, as part of a comprehensive statement of fiscal risks. Following Hurricane 
Katrina the U.S. administration proposed the inclusion of a budget line relating to the costs 
of future natural disasters.
40  This risk exposure is then sold on to private capital markets through a Catastrophe Bond, 
in which the principal is forgiven in the event of a disaster.
41  World Bank (1995) cited transmissions and distribution losses in China, Indonesia, and 
India of around 15 to 20 per cent (two-to-three times higher than most developed countries).Driving a Green Economy 
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on the order of 5–18 per cent per cent of GDP in 
OECD  countries  (OECD,  2003).  Moreover,  although 
evidence is scant, this value is perhaps even higher 
in  developing  countries.42  Governments  can  use 
their  purchasing  power  to  encourage  innovation 
and  improve  the  supply  and  competitiveness  of 
environmentally and socially responsible products. 
However  such  policies  need  to  be  carefully  and 
gradually  implemented  to  allow  both  the  public 
administration  and  the  suppliers  to  adjust  to 
the  new  requirements.  Most  developed  countries 
already have had for a number of years some form 
of  sustainable  procurement  frameworks  in  place. 
Literature reviewing the efficacy of these frameworks 
indicated some basic, broadly applicable guidelines 
for success.  Support for implementation is required 
at the highest level of government and may require 
legislative  foundations.43  Furthermore,  a  step-by-
step  approach  is  essential.  This  includes  starting 
with a small set of important products and services, 
and  providing  specific  guidance  and  training  to 
procurement  managers  while  at  the  same  time 
informing the market and allowing it to adjust and 
upgrade the supply of sustainable products. Finally, 
clear evaluation frameworks are required to ensure 
that  such  policies  do  not  lead  to  the  exclusion  of 
small-scale and domestic suppliers.   
Subsidy reform and transition to a GE
Subsidies to consumption or production vary widely 
in their implications for transition to a GE. Khan and 
others (2006) identify three categories of subsidies: 
the “good”, the “bad”, and the “ugly” (or “ambiguous”). 
While  the  precise  effects  of  any  subsidy  scheme 
are  likely  to  be  context-  and  programme-specific, 
this  framework  may  nevertheless  serve  as  a  basis 
for  considering  policy  reform  issues.  Potentially 
“good” subsidies include well-targeted measures to 
encourage sustainable activities, for example through 
support  to  R&D  in  environmental  technologies; 
and  measures  to  reduce  poverty,  such  as  support 
for access by low-income households to health and 
education  services. “Bad”  subsidies  in  this  context 
typically lead to excessive resource exploitation and 
overcapacity in environmentally harmful economic 
sectors. They  include  measures  to  artificially  lower 
the  cost  of  fossil  fuels  or  pesticides,  or  measures 
that  are  so  poorly  targeted  that  better  value  to 
finite public resources could clearly be achieved in 
other  areas. “Ugly”  subsidies  could  result  in  either 
outcome,  and  warrant  closer  examination  as  part 
of reform efforts.  Examples include so-called vessel 
“buyback” subsidies, which could either promote fish 
conservation or, if poorly designed, overcapacity; or 
fertilizer subsidies, which may increase agricultural 
productivity but could also result in increased water 
pollution.
Green subsidies
The  precise  magnitude  of  green  subsidies  is 
unclear,  but  is  likely  to  be  large  and  rising.    No 
comprehensive  estimate  on  the  scale  of  subsidies 
across  green  technologies  and  markets  currently 
exists,  but  preliminary  studies  put  the  costs  at 
around US$100 billion per year (GSI, 2010). Biofuels 
subsidies, which have been relatively well studied, 
are  estimated  to  amount  to  around  US$11  billion 
in  2006  in  the  U.S.,  Canada,  and  the  EU  (and  are 
likely  to  rise  rapidly  without  policy  reform).44 
Support to renewable electricity is also likely to be 
growing  rapidly  in  many  countries.  Severe  fiscal 
pressures in Spain, for example, recently caused the 
government to renegotiate the terms of feed-in tariff 
arrangements,  following  accrued  costs  reported 
to  be  on  the  order  of  US$20  billion  since  2000.45   
Increased and more transparent reporting of green 
(as with many other areas of) subsidies is urgently 
needed in order facilitate a robust debate regarding 
the most appropriate use of scarce public resources.
Measures  to  raise  the  cost  of  pollution  generally 
create  more  effective  incentives  for  curbing 
inefficient demand than green subsidies. The OECD 
(2004) found that the cost of displacing GHG emissions 
by means of subsidy tends to be considerably higher 
than most estimates of the marginal damage those 
emissions cause. Subsidy schemes also run the risk 
of inviting excessive entry by households and firms 
into  beneficent  areas  of  economic  activity,  and 
other  unwanted  strategic  behaviour  (for  instance, 
by encouraging households and firms to exaggerate 
any  costs  they  are  exposed  to).  Pfaff  and  others 
(2008) found that subsidies to forest protection in 
Costa Rica had little effect on rates of deforestation, 
because  payments  were  not  targeted  at  locations 
most  exposed  to  clearance  risks—the  majority 
of  lands  enrolled  in  the  programme  would  have 
remained  forested  even  without  such  payments.46   
42 8 per cent of GDP in Kenya; 30 per cent in Uganda; 35 per cent in South Africa; 43 per cent 
in India; and 47 per cent in Brazil. Odhiambo and Kamau, (2003); IISD (2008).
43  Perera,  Chowdhury,  and  Goswami  (2007);  Bouwer  and  others  (2005);  European 
Commission (2004).
44 OECD (2008b). See also Anderson (2006).
45  GSI  available  at  http://www.globalsubsidies.org/subsidy-watch/analysis/fiscal-deficit-
forces-spain-slash-renewable-energy-subsidies
46 Joskow and Marron (1992) for example stress the difficulty of targeting energy efficiency 
support to households and firms, which would not have made such investments even in 
the absence of support.26-27
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Furthermore,  the  fiscal  costs  of  this  policy  choice 
are  likely  to  become  increasingly  important,  given 
current budget pressures in many countries. These 
costs can be persistent as spending measures, and 
tax breaks, risk becoming entrenched due to political 
lobbies forming around them, even though they may 
often lack a clear rationale as a permanent policy.
Green subsidies are justified where market barriers 
and  positive  social  spillovers  clearly  exist… 
Reducing the costs of environmental protection is a 
key objective. The existence of barriers to technical 
progress  has  been  widely  used  as  an  argument 
for  subsidy  support  to  early-stage  environmental 
(and  other)  forms  of  technology.  This  reflects,  for 
example, the inability of innovators to reap the full 
social  benefits  of  innovation.47  Governments  have 
previously chosen to shape decisively the direction 
and  accelerate  the  pace  of  technological  progress 
in strategically important industries. Examples from 
the second half of the 20th century include the rapid 
expansion of nuclear power generation in France, the 
advancement of space technologies in the U.S. and 
former Soviet Union, and the specialization of Japan 
in advanced manufacturing industries.
…or  where  there  are  clear  technical  or  political 
obstacles  to  the  alternatives.  In  some  cases, 
there are limits to the capacity of policy-makers to 
implement effective systems of pollution charging. 
In fisheries, for example, it is extremely difficult to 
monitor  and  enforce  property  rights,  partly  due 
to  the  remote  and  trans-boundary  nature  of  the 
externality  problem.48  Even  where  it  is  feasible 
to  restrict  or  charge  for  certain  volumes  of  fish 
caught, this may not encourage broader sustainable 
fishing  techniques.  In  such  circumstances,  limited 
and  well-targeted  subsidies  may  be  warranted,  in 
conjunction with regulatory measures, to promote 
more sustainable resource use, for instance to fund 
fisheries management (Khan and others, 2006). From 
a political economy perspective, it may be necessary 
to accompany tax-based measures with “carrots” to 
facilitate reform.
Where green subsidies are adopted, these should 
generally  be  temporary  and  their  effectiveness 
closely  monitored.  Subsidies  may  be  required 
in  some  cases  because  of  the  lack  of  feasible, 
effective  alternatives,  and  some  expectation 
of  beneficial  spillover  effects.  Stern  (2008)  for 
example  advocates  US$5  billion  per  year  to  help 
support  commercialization  of  30  carbon  capture 
and storage (CCS) plants in the coming years.49 The 
social  benefits  of  demonstrating  the  viability  of 
this  potentially  strategically  important  technology 
could  be  significant,  particularly  for  projects  in 
developing  countries.  However,  the  market  has 
no  incentives  to  deliver  this  technology  without 
effective emissions pricing (since it actually reduces 
energy productivity) frameworks, which so far have 
been slow to emerge. As such, there may be a case 
for  targeted  government  support  to  realize  these 
benefits,  while  seeking  to  foster  a  more  rational 
pricing framework in the medium and longer term. 
More generally, governments should limit fiscal risks, 
and  promote  value  for  public  money,  by  ensuring 
that programmes are regularly reviewed and subject 
to clear “sunset” clauses which credibly provide for 
their dissolution. This can be achieved for instance 
through a cap on total spending which phases out 
support over time, pre-arranged operational reviews, 
agreed  adjustment  conditions,  as  well  as  caps  on 
total spending (Victor, 2009).
Direct  spending  on  research  and  development 
may  be  preferable  to  tax  incentives  for  the 
development  of  environmental  technologies. 
Although intensifying international tax competition 
has  fuelled  R&D  tax  incentives  in  many  countries, 
there is evidence to suggest that these do increase 
spending  on  R&D  and  patenting.50  However, 
ensuring that such expenditures promote innovation 
that generates social rather than private benefits is 
difficult. Tax  reductions  may  also  be  ineffective  in 
an environment where corporate profitability is low, 
and  for  innovative  start-ups  more  generally. While 
also subject to risks of rent-seeking behaviour and 
inefficient divestment choices, it may be somewhat 
easier  to  direct  public  spending  support  towards 
areas of private innovation that confer social returns 
that exceed private benefits (IMF, 2008). Increasing 
R&D  expenditure  on  improving  crop  and  other 
agricultural  yields,  for  example,  is  likely  to  be  an 
important  means  of  reducing  long  term  pressures 
on land resources arising from a growing population 
(OECD,  2009).  Reversing  the  significant  declines 
in  public  support  to  basic  energy  R&D  seen  since 
the 1980s, and shifting its composition away from 
conventional  energy  technologies,  would  seem 
desirable in the context of tackling climate change.51   
There  are  also  important  equity  considerations  to 
47 However,  estimates  of  these  spillovers  should  take  account  of  the  likely  powerful 
incentives for private innovation arising from robust and credible taxation of pollution.
48 FAO (2001), for example, identifies illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing as one of 
the major factors that drive overexploitation of marine resources worldwide.
49 Note  that  this  is  a  controversial  and  highly  contested  technology  due  to  safety  and 
efficiency considerations. 
50 See, for example, Jaumotte and Pain (2005).
51 Determining the proper extent of any R&D support is inherently difficult. However, as an 
indication of possible orders of magnitudes, Newell (2008) recommends roughly a doubling 
of U.S. energy R&D to US$8 billion per year by 2016.Driving a Green Economy 
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R&D expenditure in agriculture: a 10 per cent rise in 
smallholder  productivity  can  reduce  rural  poverty 
levels by 7 per cent in Africa and 5 per cent in Asia (Irz 
and others, 2001).
Subsidies to environmentally harmful activities 
Environmentally  harmful  subsidies  are 
fuelling  unsustainable  economic  activity  and 
environmental  degradation,  including  through 
waste  and  overuse—leading  to  the  premature 
exhaustion of valuable finite resources or the long-
term depletion of renewable resources that support 
valuable  economic  activity.  Global  subsidies  to 
fisheries for example are thought to be one of the key 
factors driving over-fishing (Sumaila and Pauly, 2006). 
Many agricultural subsidies are generally believed to 
intensify production, with adverse effects for water 
pollution.52  Support  to  fossil  fuels  is  estimated  to 
increase global GHG emissions on the order of five-
to-ten per cent (OECD, 2010).
“Brown”  subsidies  are  expensive,  and  can 
significantly  constrain  transition  towards  a  GE. 
When  subsidization  makes  unsustainable  activity 
artificially  cheap  or  low-risk,  it  biases  the  market 
against  investment  in  green  alternatives.  There 
is  wide  consensus  that  subsidies  to  fossil  fuels, 
for  example,  pose  a  significant  barrier  to  the 
development  of  renewable  energy  technologies.53   
In  addition,  the  fiscal  costs,  while  often  poorly 
reported, are widely acknowledged to be enormous. 
The net global support to fossil fuels, for example, 
has been estimated at US$500 billion per year (GSI, 
2009). Global fishing subsidies, at least 60 per cent 
of which have been identified as harmful, have been 
estimated at US$30-34 billion annually (Sumaila and 
Pauly, 2006). 
Subsidies  can  be  of  questionable  benefit  to  the 
poor…  Subsidies  are  often  created  in  order  to 
transfer  welfare  to  low-income  households,  but 
unless the aid is targeted, the majority of spending 
often leaks to higher-income households. Tariffs on 
household  electricity  and  water  consumption,  for 
example, are set below the cost of supply in many 
developing  countries  (OECD,  2005).  However,  the 
benefits of these subsidies are often enjoyed by all 
consumers,  and  the  poorest  may  either  not  have 
access to basic services, or share supplies with other 
households, so that their consumption levels exceed 
the “life line” thresholds for subsidized supplies. One 
recent review estimates that over 80 per cent of the 
benefits from fuel subsidies commonly go to the top 
three income quintiles (Arze del Granado and others, 
forthcoming). 
….and  may  even  be  actively  harmful  in  some 
cases. Failure to recoup the full costs of supplying 
basic  services,  such  as  water  and  electricity,  for 
example,  limits  the  capacity  of  governments  to 
invest in expanding supplies to those still without 
access,  and  to  achieving  often  much-needed 
improvements in service quality. Internationally, the 
level of government support provided to agricultural 
producers in OECD countries, for example, estimated 
at US$265 billion in 2008, is trade-distorting, causing 
large welfare losses in developing countries (OECD, 
n.d.). Similarly, half of global subsidies to fisheries are 
provided by developed countries, distorting prices 
and  costs  in  favour  of  developed  country  fishing 
industries (Sumaila and Pauly, 2006). 
Reform  of  environmentally  harmful  subsidies 
is  therefore  a  key  priority,  but  is  challenging 
to  achieve  from  both  a  practical  and  political 
standpoint.  Subsidy  reform  focusing  on  reducing 
and  eliminating  harmful  subsidies,  particularly  in 
agriculture, energy, fisheries, forests and water, is a 
top priority. However, careful policy implementation 
is  needed  to  overcome  political  opposition  from 
vested interests, and to avoid adverse distributional 
and  market  outcomes.  Three  key  steps  are  here 
advocated:
•  First,  improve  information  regarding  the 
magnitude  and  distributional  consequences  of 
major  subsidy  programmes  using  a  consistent 
methodical approach to reporting and evaluation. 
Information on subsidies to both green and brown 
technologies, as well as access to basic services, 
is  currently  limited,  particularly  in  developing 
countries.  This  impedes  the  ability  of  policy-
makers  to  make  effective  judgments  on  reform 
priorities.
•   Second, design a strategy for the implementation 
of  subsidy  reform.  Designing  conditional  cash 
transfer  and  other  income  support  measures  is 
critical to off-setting the impact of subsidy reform 
on the real incomes of low-income groups. Reform 
generally  needs  to  be  phased  in:  for  example, 
52 Mayand and others (2003) cite one study which concludes that the complete removal of 
agricultural domestic support would result in a 35 per cent reduction in total chemical use 
per hectare, and a 29 per cent reduction in fertilizer use per hectare.
53 UNEP (2008); El Sobki, Wooders, and Sherif (2009).28-29
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expanding access to, and improving the quality 
of,  basic  services  may  require  a  series  of  tariff  
increases, aimed initially at recovering operational 
and maintenance costs, and subsequently aimed 
at recouping capital investment needs.
•   Third, monitoring and review of the effectiveness 
and  any  unintended  consequences  of  subsidy 
reform,  in  particular  whether  compensation 
policies are reaching their intended beneficiaries. 
Gradual reform is generally desirable, with careful 
attention paid to potentially unintended effects 
of  subsidy  and  other  policy  reforms.  Increasing 
kerosene  prices,  for  example,  may  induce 
substitution towards burning wood, with adverse 
implications  for  both  health  and  deforestation 
(Pitt,  1985).  Likewise  tighter  fishing  controls 
may  encourage  more  destructive  techniques, 
such as bottom trawling, in an effort to sustain 
profitability.Driving a Green Economy 
Through Public Finance and Fiscal Policy Reform
VI. Concluding 
     Remarks
A Green Economy can be defined as one that results 
in  improved  human  well-being  and  social  equity, 
while  significantly  reducing  environmental  risks 
and  ecological  scarcities.  Indeed,  this  paper  has 
attempted to show that improved management of 
scarce  environmental  and  natural  resources  offers 
significant economic opportunities – and that these 
opportunities  are  most  significant  where  existing 
policy  distortions  are  large,  for  example,  due  to 
the  widespread  subsidization  of  environmentally 
harmful activities such as fossil fuel consumption.
Realizing  the  opportunities  from  green  growth 
and  more  environmentally  sustainable  areas 
of  job  creation  has  thus  become  an  important 
macroeconomic  policy  priority  for  many 
governments.  This  implies  substantially  increased 
investments across a range of economic sectors that 
build on and enhance the Earth’s natural capital or 
reduce ecological scarcities and environmental risks.
Encouraging the transition to a GE requires a broad 
range of regulatory, and information-based measures; 
legal  and  institutional  developments  affecting 
governance capacity; as well as structural reforms, for 
example, to key markets such as energy. However, fiscal 
measures are likely to be of particular importance.
Tax  frameworks  have  a  fundamental  effect  on 
the  structure  of  incentives  facing  businesses  and 
households.  However,  taxation  in  general  still 
remains too favourable to environmentally harmful 
consumption or investment decisions. Implementing 
a broader and more robust environmental taxation 
scheme  is  therefore  a  key  objective.  A  number 
of  countries  have  already  made  positive  use  of 
environmentally  related  taxes,  particularly  for 
motor  fuels,  while  levies  on  natural  resources  are 
also increasingly being employed especially among 
resource rich countries.
Public  expenditure—current  spending  as  well 
as  capital  investments  in  public  infrastructure  or 
R&D—also plays a critical role in shaping economic 
development.  Ensuring  an  equitable  economic 
transition,  including  through  provision  of  careful 
and  effective  compensation  arrangements  where 
warranted, is another imperative of public spending. 
Avoiding  general  price  subsidies,  which  are  often 
inequitable, expensive, and undermine the relative 
price changes necessary to encourage transition to 
a GE, is likely to be critical in this regard.
Such  a  diverse  range  of  policies  will  need  to  be 
carefully  coordinated  to  ensure  the  measures  are 
complementary, and do not counteract each other. 
Effective  implementation  is  therefore  likely  to 
require close cooperation across different parts of 
government, particularly finance and environment 
departments,  including  at  an  international  level. 
Building  the  necessary  implementation  capacity, 
including  in  the  environment  and  customs  and 
revenue agencies, is also likely to be an important 
dimension, particularly in developing countries. 
Finally,  strengthening  political  consensus  on  the 
costs and benefits of a transition to a GE is likely to be 
a critical element in effective fiscal policy reform. On 
the technical side, this could be supported through 
the development of a robust evaluation framework, 
including, for example, a sound set of indicators to 
help assess interactions between the environment 
and the economy, and evaluate policy progress.30-31
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